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The Accounting Profession’s Engagement with Accounting Standards:  





Regulators, standard setters, and the accounting profession maintain that complexity in 
accounting standards is a significant issue. However, it is unclear what complexity means in the 
context of accounting standards. This study examines, via comment letter submissions, the 
accounting profession’s engagement with complexity in accounting standards. We analyze 
comment letters submitted to the Financial Accounting Standards Board over a 12-year period 
and find the profession characterizes complexity through three dimensions – multiplicity, 
diversity, and interrelatedness. We examine the Big 4’s discourse on these dimensions and 
observe consistency between audit firms in their discourse on several features. For instance, we 
find that firms primarily oppose proposed FASB changes when firms perceive those changes to 
increase rather than decrease complexity. Additionally, firms perceive proposed changes to 
affect financial statement preparers more often than other stakeholders. However, the Big 4 do 
not hold universal opinions as to the root causes of complexity. At the cross-firm level, we find 
inconsistencies that imply heterogeneity in the Big 4’s discourse on root causes. Such 
inconsistency may, in and of itself, construct accounting complexity. Ultimately, we maintain 
that the Big 4’s engagement with accounting standards has consequences for how complexity is 
thought and acted upon in accounting standards. 
 
Keywords: accounting profession, discursive engagement, comment letters, accounting 





The notion of complexity in accounting standards has attracted much attention over the 
last decades, with debates over the complexity of accounting standards acquiring a certain 
prominence for regulators and accounting standard setters (Murphy 2015). For instance, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) Advisory Committee on Improvements to 
Financial Reporting issued a report in 2008 that recommended “reducing the complexity of the 
financial reporting system to investors, preparers, and auditors” (SEC 2008). The SEC 
committee also recommended that the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) should 
minimize “avoidable complexity” (SEC 2008). In an initiative to simplify U.S. Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), the Chairman of the FASB prioritized the reduction of 
complexity resulting from accounting standards (Chasan 2013; FASB 2014). Likewise, the 
accounting profession indicated complexity in accounting standards to be a significant issue.1 
For example, Deloitte suggested in a letter to the Chairman of the FASB that the FASB should 
broaden its strategy to address complexity outside of the simplification initiative (Deloitte 2013). 
Thus, the contemporary discourse of the accounting profession around complexity is consistent 
with that of regulators and standard setters.  
While the concept of complexity has generated significant attention, it is unclear what 
complexity means in the context of accounting. Prior research focuses on various aspects of 
complexity in accounting through studies of organizational complexity (Bushman, Chen, Engle, 
and Smith 2004), financial reporting complexity (Li 2008; Miller 2010; Hobson 2011; Lehavy, 
Li, and Merkley 2011; Filzen and Peterson 2015), and information complexity (Plumlee 2003; 
                                                            
1 We refer to the accounting profession broadly as encompassing both accounting firms and professional accounting 
associations. We use the term accounting firms to refer to all firms in the accounting profession. We use the term 
audit(ing), firm(s) or Big N (currently 4) to refer to a select group of accounting firms that represent the largest 
professional services firms and those specifically studied in this paper. Finally, we refer to the AICPA and state-
level accounting bodies as professional accounting associations. 
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Peterson 2012). These studies take complexity as a given in order to investigate the economic 
consequences of complexity as opposed to questioning the concept of complexity itself. This 
paper seeks to conceptualize complexity by examining the accounting profession’s engagement 
with, and discourse on, complexity in accounting standards. In doing so, our work makes an 
early contribution to a research agenda aimed at better understanding norms of complexity and 
their impact on accounting, auditing, and governance (Malsch, Tremblay, and Gendron 2017). 
We focus on the engagement of the accounting profession in accounting standard setting 
considering that the profession consistently participates in the comment letter process (Jorissen, 
Lybaert, Orens, and van der Tas 2012, 2014). Through this engagement, we observe less the 
direct influence of the profession on accounting standards and more the profession’s indirect 
influence through its discourse (Cooper and Robson 2006). For instance, complexity might be 
viewed as a discursive resource to strategically promote certain interests or claims to expertise.  
Focusing on the accounting profession’s discourse on complexity, we examine comment 
letters submitted by the profession on FASB accounting proposals over the 12-year period from 
2003 to 2014. The purpose of this examination is to understand what the profession’s discourse 
and engagement might reveal about the concept of complexity, and the consequences that the 
profession’s engagement with this concept has for accounting standards. We argue that the 
profession, and the Big 4 in particular, plays an important role in conceptualizing complexity but 
that its own discourse may contribute to complexity in accounting standards. 
We draw from prior complexity literature to identify three theoretical dimensions of 
complexity: multiplicity, diversity, and interrelatedness (Jacobs and Swink 2011; Jacobs 2013). 
We mobilize these theoretical dimensions to understand how the accounting profession 
conceptualizes complexity in accounting standards. For instance, prior research on complexity 
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defines multiplicity as the number of elements, choices, or information cues to be processed. 
With respect to accounting standards, multiplicity is identified as the number of choices provided 
within standards and the amount and nature of information required by specific standards. In 
contrast, diversity refers to the degree of differences across elements including the number of 
variants, differentiation, and rate of information change. Diversity in accounting standards relates 
to variation in concepts and treatments across standards and between different sets of standards. 
Finally, the complexity literature views interrelatedness as common functions embodied in 
elements and the interaction of those elements in the system. In accounting standards, the 
functions of standards include their operationality, usability, and auditability. These functions 
interact with the dimensions of multiplicity and diversity. 
We initially examine comment letters submitted by the accounting profession in order to 
gain an understanding of the profession’s discourse as it relates to the dimensions of complexity 
in accounting standards. Thereafter, we narrow our focus to letters submitted by the Big 4 since, 
consistent with prior research, the Big 4 engages with accounting standard setting more than 
other types of actors in the accounting profession (Jorissen et al. 2014; Ramirez 2012). Through 
our examination of the Big 4’s discourse, we find that the concept of complexity is a prominent 
theme in standard setting and that distinct discussions around the three dimensions of complexity 
exist.  
Additionally, we analyze whether the Big 4: support or oppose FASB proposals, perceive 
proposals to be increasing or decreasing complexity, and perceive proposals to be affected by 
particular root causes of complexity and to affect certain stakeholders. We find that the Big 4 
primarily oppose changes they perceive to increase rather than decrease complexity. In addition, 
we find that audit firms perceive changes that increase complexity to affect preparers more than 
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users or auditors. We note consistency between audit firms in their discourse across proposed 
changes in terms of their support for, or opposition to, a change and whether the change would 
increase or decrease complexity. However, firm discourse is less consistent when firms speak 
about the root causes of complexity.  
Our paper contributes to the literature on accounting complexity and the profession’s 
engagement in accounting standard setting in three ways. First, previous research on accounting 
complexity has focused on studying the relationship between different measures of complexity 
and firm, manager, or user performance (e.g., Plumlee 2003; Bushman et al. 2004; Li 2008; 
Miller 2010; Lehavy et al. 2011; Peterson 2012; Filzen and Peterson 2015). Such studies 
generally measure complexity using quantitative proxies, which are presented as objective 
characteristics of complexity. We do not claim it necessary to develop or agree on an absolute 
definition of complexity; rather, we believe it is possible to characterize complexity as an object 
which is socially constructed (Power and Gendron 2015). It is important to characterize 
complexity as a construct since it underlies the dissemination and enactment of policy innovation 
(e.g., the FASB Simplification Initiative); yet official discourses surrounding complexity are 
often taken for granted (Malsch and Gendron 2011).2 We believe our paper is one of the first to 
conceptualize complexity in accounting standards, through a systematic description of the 
theoretical dimensions of complexity.  
Second, this paper builds on the literature that examines the accounting profession’s 
engagement in standard setting (e.g., Haring 1979; Puro 1984; Radcliffe, Cooper, and Robson 
                                                            
2  The FASB launched its Simplification Initiative “to make more narrowly targeted improvements and 
simplifications to financial reporting through a series of short term projects.” The FASB presents three current 
projects and ten projects completed as part of this initiative. They also present two completed projects that are not 
directly part of the initiative but which “simplified elements of GAAP.” From this initiative, the FASB indicates that 
it has learned that “reducing unnecessary complexity (and costs) is a concept that we can apply to all our projects” 
(FASB 2017). 
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1994; Saemann 1999; Greenwood, Suddaby, and Hinings 2002). Recent work has rekindled 
debates implicating the Big 4, in particular, in the development of accounting standards (Malsch 
and Gendron 2011; Allen, Ramanna, and Roychowdhury 2013, 2014). Our paper appeals to this 
literature and meets Cooper and Robson’s (2006) call for a greater focus on the link between 
studies of accounting standard setting and the activities of the profession, which have yet to be 
fully explored. Contrary to much standard-setting research, we study the way in which the 
accounting profession discursively engages with standards and propose that, in doing so, the 
profession plays an active role in the construction of accounting complexity. We agree with 
Humphrey, Loft, and Woods (2009, 811) that audit researchers need to be aware of the 
institutions with whom the profession interacts and the ways in which such interactions set the 
boundaries for the policies and thought processes that shape practice.  
Finally, we add to research on the Big 4’s contribution to the development of standards. 
Where accounting proposals may affect the accounting profession in different ways (Gipper, 
Lombardi, and Skinner 2013), factions of the profession may not perceive accounting matters in 
the same way or hold consistent ways of thinking (Abbott 1988; Durocher and Gendron 2014). 
We argue that the Big 4’s comments are important activities to study as they reflect their views 
and thought processes on accounting standards, for instance on how accounting standards may 
accentuate or attenuate complexity. Our results provide evidence that the Big 4 actively engage 
in discourse on complexity, think about how proposed changes to accounting standards may 
impact complexity, and consider the potential implications of complexity for financial statement 
preparers. Yet, we find that audit firms do not always engage with complexity in a unified way, 
which has implications for the way accounting standards ultimately develop. Overall, our 
findings reveal that the Big 4 act as “conflicted intermediaries.” On the one hand, they advocate 
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for their client’s concerns for overly complex standards and thrive on opportunities to solve 
issues of complexity. Yet from a cross-firm perspective, the extent of inconsistency we find is 
potentially in line with the firm’s economic interests. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we review relevant 
literature on the accounting profession’s engagement with accounting standards and outline the 
theoretical foundations for our analysis. We describe data collection and analysis in Section 3. 
Section 4 presents our findings while Section 5 discusses potential implications and concludes. 
II. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
Accounting Profession Engagement with Standards  
Research shows the accounting profession consistently engages in the development of 
accounting standards over time and across topics. Some studies focus on understanding the 
engagement of both accounting firms and professional associations and consider them tightly 
entwined (e.g., Tandy and Wilburn 1992; Kenny and Larson 1993; Saemann 1999; Jorissen et al. 
2012, 2014). However, the link between accounting firms and professional associations is also 
suggested to be a tenuous one in that the accounting profession often does not convey an image 
of tight organization and unity (Greenwood et al. 2002; Gendron and Spira 2009; Lander, Koene, 
and Linssen 2013). In this regard, other studies focus on the engagement of the accounting firms 
and, specifically, on the Big N.  
The focus on accounting firms’ engagement in the development of standards increased 
after the Metcalf Committee of the U.S. Senate issued a report identifying the (then) Big 8 as 
dominant powers in the standard-setting process (Haring 1979). Haring (1979) finds significant 
evidence that accounting firms’ positions (i.e., overall support for or opposition to a rule) 
influence the outcomes of the FASB; however, this was challenged by later research (Brown 
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1981; Newman 1981; Hussein and Ketz 1991). For instance, Brown (1981) finds that outcomes 
of the FASB standard-setting process vary depending on the issues underlying each project but 
not in relation to the positions taken by the accounting firms.  
As the influence of accounting firms on FASB standard-setting outcomes is difficult to 
observe, researchers have taken different approaches to understanding accounting firms’ 
engagement with standards. One approach is to study the link between the issues underlying 
standard-setting projects, and the participation of and positions taken by firms (Puro 1984; 
Saemann 1999; Allen et al. 2013). Puro (1984) indicates that accounting firms participate in the 
development of standards in two ways. First, firms participate when the FASB proposes new 
accounting and disclosure requirements and, second when changes are proposed to standardize 
the treatment of an accounting issue. On these two issues, Saemann (1999) shows that the 
AICPA (a proxy for accounting firms) opposes proposed FASB changes that affect the level of 
detail and disclosure required (i.e., new accounting and disclosure) and the number of 
alternatives afforded by accounting standards (i.e., standardization of treatment).  
Another approach to studying engagement with the development of standards is to focus 
on the firms’ motivations for participation. Motivation is often linked to several perspectives, 
including that accounting firms act in the: (1) private and/or client-focused interest of the 
profession (Canning and O’Dwyer 2001; Dwyer and Roberts 2004; Malsch and Gendron 2011, 
2013), or (2) public interest in protecting the public or users of financial statements (Willmott, 
Cooper, and Puxty 1993; Roberts, Dwyer, and Sweeney 2003). Studies on the motivation of 
accounting firms to participate in standard setting have centered on whether client-auditor 
relationships impact the positions accounting firms take on standard-setting proposals. Haring 
(1979) and Watts and Zimmerman (1982) find insignificant evidence that clients, or preparers, 
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influence firms’ positions on accounting policy. Other research finds that firms express both their 
client’s interest and their own interest, particularly on proposals they perceive as creating 
demand for professional services (Puro 1984). Saemann’s (1999) research indicates an overall 
bias in firms’ positions towards user considerations; however, the author also identifies a trend in 
more recent standards towards preparer concerns. At the same time, contemporary research 
indicates that litigation and regulatory scrutiny (i.e., private interest) drive the engagement of the 
Big 4 while client views on accounting standards do not (Allen et al. 2013). Based on the above, 
our understanding of accounting firms’ engagement with proposed FASB changes – both in 
terms of underlying issues at stake and of motivating factors – is fragmented and limited.  
 While research has shed light on engagement in the standard-setting process, there is less 
understanding as to the way in which accounting issues might be conceptualized or the 
normative claims that might be made about such issues. Therefore, our paper presents an in-
depth qualitative study of the discourse expressed in comment letters on accounting proposals. 
Some have argued that the days of using comment letters to affect accounting policy are long 
gone, as the firms say less about their positions on particular standards in a desire to avoid client-
service issues (Zeff 2003). We propose there is more to be learned through the accounting 
profession’s discourse in comment letters. Specifically, how the profession engages in the 
process of standard setting, how it views issues, understands problems (Cooper and Robson 
2006; Gipper et al. 2013), and how the profession may help to construct standards (Sikka, Puxty, 
Willmott, and Cooper 1998). 
One obstacle the accounting profession struggles with in its engagement with standards is 
the absence of a formal body of accounting knowledge (Hines 1989). Hines (1989) suggests that 
the conceptual framework arose as a means of creating the perception that the profession has a 
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formal knowledge base and that the development of a conceptual framework would enable the 
creation of theoretically grounded and consistent standards. Larson (1977) argues that a 
profession’s body of knowledge should be formalized enough to allow standardization, yet 
should not be clearly codified implying some deliberate complexity. However, until now, the 
conceptual framework remains highly contested, incomplete and inconsistent, and is sidelined as 
“non-authoritative” guidance. As such, standards are derived less from a core body of theoretical 
accounting knowledge and more as the residual of a political process that produces ad hoc 
accounting standards (Hines 1989). This political process is one of exposure, participation, and 
ratification in a public due process; through this process, influential groups can affect the way 
that standards develop (Solomons 1983; Gipper et al. 2013).  
Accounting standards are likely to be affected by accounting firms given their ability to 
confront potential explanations of “what might go wrong” and to identify how issues might be 
resolved (Gendron 2000). Accounting firms play a key role in legitimizing accounting 
information through claims to expertise (Malsch and Gendron 2009). Firms not only interpret 
accounting standards and verify the practical application of those standards in certifying 
accounts, but also contribute to the development of accounting policy (Malsch and Gendron 
2009; Power and Gendron 2015). Indeed, Cooper and Robson (2006, 417) argue that research on 
professions and standards has often neglected to see the accounting profession as significant 
agents. These authors indicate that the Big 4, in particular, have considerable influence on how 
accounting policy is created and disseminated through their interaction with a range of regulatory 
institutions, professional committees, and participation in the standard-setting process 
(Humphrey et al. 2009; Ramirez 2012). Our paper provides insight into how the accounting 
profession, and the Big 4 in particular, interacts with and views complexity in the accounting 
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standard-setting process. 
Complexity in Accounting 
No formal definition of complexity exists within the accounting academic literature; 
rather, prior research has examined complexity from different perspectives. These perspectives 
include organizational complexity (Bushman et al. 2004), financial reporting complexity (Li 
2008), and information complexity (Plumlee 2003; Peterson 2012). In such studies, complexity 
is undefined conceptually but studied through a variety of proxies. For instance, Bushman et al. 
(2004) use proxies such as size, geographic segments, and number of business or product lines to 
study organizational-level complexity and find evidence that complexity affects governance 
factors such as board structure and ownership concentration.  
A second perspective on accounting complexity focuses on companies’ overall financial 
reporting complexity. Such studies measure complexity based on the length of the report or its 
readability (Li 2008; Miller 2010; Lehavy et al. 2011), where readability is determined using the 
Gunning Fog Index (GFI). 3  Researchers then link this measure to various outcomes. For 
example, Li (2008) finds that annual reports of companies with lower earnings are harder to read 
(i.e., have a higher GFI, are longer, and are more complex). Lehavy et al. (2011) show that 
greater (collective) effort is required to generate analyst reports on more complex 10-K filings 
and that this effort produces less accurate forecasts. Therefore, it seems that managers may make 
disclosure choices that make it more difficult for users to uncover information that managers do 
not want to be uncovered (Li 2008; Lehavy et al. 2011).4  
A third perspective on complexity maintains that complexity stems from a combination 
                                                            
3 The GFI represents a measure of overall complexity as it incorporates the number of words per sentence and the 
number of complex words (i.e., words with three or more syllables) in a document to derive a measure of the 
readability of firm reports (Li 2008; Loughran and McDonald 2016). 
4 See also Miller (2010), Rennekamp (2012), and Filzen and Peterson (2015). 
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of the underlying economic transactions and financial reporting standards relevant to companies 
(i.e., information complexity) (Plumlee 2003; Peterson 2012; Bobek Schmitt, Chen, Hageman, 
and Tian 2016). This research focuses on the effect that complexity in taxation and dividends has 
on users of that information. For instance, Plumlee (2003) finds that more complex information 
imposes a cost on analysts. Hobson (2011) shows that reducing the complexity of information 
about dividends increases the processing of that information by investors. Finally, Bobek Schmitt 
et al. (2016) show that information complexity negatively affects accuracy and optimal decision 
making by individual taxpayers. 
In relation to financial reporting standards, Peterson (2012) finds that revenue recognition 
complexity increases the probability of revenue restatements due to both intentional and 
unintentional behavior. Thus, while complex accounting may allow managers to manipulate 
financial statements, it may also increase the likelihood of mistakes and error when applying 
standards (Peterson 2012). Where unintentional misreporting could arise due to complexity 
driven by the requirements of accounting standards, accounting complexity remains an important 
issue for standard setters. Indeed, both the FASB and SEC suggest that complexity is a major 
contributor to the increased incidence of financial statement misreporting (Cox 2007; Herz 
2013).  
Prior research helps us to understand the effects of complexity within the financial 
accounting system, including on firm, manager, and user performance. Yet, most studies take 
complexity as a given and do not question the concept of complexity. As suggested by Alvesson 
and Sandberg (2013), and highly relevant in the context of accounting research, there is a critical 
need for more reflexivity on the part of researchers engaging with accounting concepts. While 
regulators, standard setters, and the press continue to express concern about accounting 
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complexity, the term complexity is often used in a loose manner and research on 
(conceptualizing) complexity in accounting standards is lacking. 
Practical debates over the complexity of accounting standards often speculate as to its 
causes and consequences. For instance, regulators note that globalization and innovation in the 
capital markets, the proliferation of standard setters, the existence of other sources of standards, 
and overly prescriptive rules lead to complexity (SEC 2006). Complexity, as presented by the 
FASB, involves standards that are too dense and complicated, or those whose cost of production 
exceeds its information value to users (FASB 2014). The rhetoric of the accounting profession, 
particularly of the audit firms, around the consequences of accounting complexity largely aligns 
with the FASB. For instance, a PwC paper indicated that overly complicated rules force 
treatments that do not align with the underlying economics of transactions (PwC 2011). While 
debates over the complexity of accounting standards have grown, our understanding of 
complexity and the profession’s engagement with complexity has escaped critical analysis.  
Academic research on complexity in accounting standards, specifically research 
emphasizing the linkage between the accounting profession and complexity, is sparse. One 
example is Durocher, Gendron, and Picard (2016) who examine how small accounting firms 
perceive and react to complex, global accounting standards. A significant proportion of small 
firms opt for lower assurance engagements in response to the increasing complexity in standards 
(Durocher et al. 2016). Such firms might not have the resources to devote to participation in the 
standard-setting process (Fogarty, Radcliffe, and Campbell 2006) even though their clients may 
be the most affected by complexity in accounting standards (Evans et al. 2005). As such, while 
small accounting firms represent the vast majority of practicing accountants (Ramirez 2009), it 
seems they may not play a significant role in the way accounting complexity develops. Outside 
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of these papers, we are aware of no systematic analysis of the way in which the accounting 
profession conceptualizes and engages with complexity in accounting standards.  
Conceptualizing Complexity in Accounting Standards 
To conceptualize how the accounting profession characterizes complexity in accounting 
standards, we build our theoretical foundation from prior complexity literature. Jacobs and 
Swink (2011) examine complexity from multiple disciplines in an effort to define complexity. 
They note that, although the various disciplines apply the concept of complexity to different 
objects, the conceptualizations of complexity across disciplines all share three similar 
dimensions: multiplicity, diversity, and interrelatedness (Jacobs and Swink 2011). For instance, 
the systems literature treats complexity as related to a system of elements and the extent of 
interaction of these elements (Simon 1962). As a multidimensional construct, the complexity of a 
system depends on the extent to which it reflects multiple, diverse, and interrelated elements 
(Simon 1962; Perrow 1984). 
The prior research on complexity defines the individual dimensions as follows. 
Multiplicity relates to having a larger number of elements, choices, and information cues to be 
processed (Jacobs and Swink 2011; Jacobs 2013). Thus, multiplicity relates to the amount of 
information, choice, and flexibility within standards. Choice within standards is linked to the 
various elections and alternatives that standards make available to a company. Multiplicity also 
relates to the amount of information required by standards and the flexibility a firm has in the 
presentation of that information in financial statements and/or footnotes. 
Diversity relates to the degree of differences in elements across the system in terms of 
their attributes (Jacobs and Swink 2011; Jacobs 2013). A system is diverse, and more complex, if 
it includes larger numbers of variants, greater differentiation, and increasing rates of information 
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change. In contrast to multiplicity, standards reflect diversity if the system of standards lacks 
consistency or has greater variation across standards. Lack of consistency across standards can 
result from incongruence between requirements of standards as they are interpreted and applied 
across the system. Diversity can also arise due to differences in the way requirements of 
standards appear in specific industries or geographic regulations (e.g., GAAP and IFRS). 
Interrelatedness relates to the common or interacting functions embodied in elements of a 
system (Jacobs and Swink 2011; Jacobs 2013). Complexity, as it relates to interrelatedness, is 
proportional to the interaction among elements and functions in a system. In terms of accounting 
standards, interrelatedness is associated with the functions that standards are presumed to 
perform for key stakeholders. For instance, financial statement preparers apply the standards to 
financial statements, auditors verify the financial statements, and users need to understand the 
financial statements. Interrelatedness also speaks to whether such functions interact consistently 
within and across standards. 
We expect the dimensions of multiplicity, diversity, and interrelatedness to be a relevant 
starting point to carry out our investigation of how the accounting profession conceptualizes 
complexity. Thus, applying the prior theoretical concepts of complexity to our setting, we define 
the dimensions of complexity as follows. Multiplicity relates to characteristics of accounting 
standards that represent the numbers of features, components, or variations within a standard. 
Diversity, emphasizes the dissimilar treatment of features, components, or variations across 
standards. Finally, Interrelatedness refers to the extent of common functions embodied in the 
standards. Using this conceptual framework, we examine the following questions. How does the 
accounting profession conceptualize accounting complexity? How do audit firms engage with 
complexity in accounting standards? How does audit firm engagement produce and reproduce 
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complexity? For each of these questions, the very meaning of complexity is not a given but 
something that may differ between actors and across their discourse. 
III. METHOD 
This paper presents an in-depth study of the engagement of the accounting profession in 
the development of accounting standards (Pratt 2009). Our particular focus is with the content of 
comment letters submitted by the accounting profession on FASB proposals and what that 
content tells us about how the accounting profession conceptualizes and engages with 
complexity in accounting standards. Our analysis is iterative in that we begin with the 
dimensions of complexity, look for patterns and trends, and then go back to the complexity 
dimensions to help understand these patterns and trends in our specific context.  
We employ content analysis of the accounting profession’s discourse in comment letters 
following Beck, Campbell, and Shrives’ (2010) use of a blended interpretive and mechanistic 
approach. We use an interpretive approach to uncover patterns and trends in the accounting 
profession’s discourse within the comment letters. Keeping the theoretical dimensions of 
complexity in mind, we apply coding procedures to identify labels, categories, and themes 
(Dacin, Munir, and Tracey 2010) and then move back to the theoretical framework to organize 
our themes into the theoretical dimensions. The mechanistic approach helps us to identify 
specific comment letters for study and to highlight broad patterns, trends, and relations within 
and between different theoretical dimensions of the framework to make broader inferences about 
those dimensions. 
Data Collection  
We collected comment letters submitted to the FASB on accounting proposals issued 
during the period from 2003 to 2014. All comment letters submitted on FASB proposals made 
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from 2002 onward are publicly available on the FASB website5; however, we restricted our data 
collection to a smaller population of accounting proposals. First, we collected comment letters 
beginning with proposals issued in 2003 to avoid comment letters submitted by Arthur Andersen, 
which would only have been available for one year. Second, we collected letters related to FASB 
proposals representing either new statements or revisions to statements; and did not focus on 
FASB discussion papers, staff positions, or proposals by the Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF) 
so as not to confound different policy-making processes or types of standards. Finally, we 
refrained from analyzing joint projects conducted with the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB) so as not to commingle international political and economic issues.  
As a result, we identified 864 comment letters submitted by the accounting profession on 
73 FASB proposals across the 12 years under study.6 We initiated pilot coding on the entire 
population of accounting profession comment letters. 7  We followed established coding 
techniques and procedures (Dacin et al. 2010; Miles, Huberman, and Saldana 2013) for 
interpretive coding using NVivo, a commonly used qualitative research application that 
facilitates content analysis. First, we coded a sample of comment letters in NVivo by reading 
each sentence and identifying the main topics of the sentence. One of the authors assigned 
descriptive labels (node per NVivo terminology) to each sentence with the aim to stay as true to 
                                                            
5http://www.fasb.org/cs/ContentServer?site=FASB&c=Page&pagename=FASB%2FPage%2FSectionPage&cid=117
6157086783, accessed 1 July 2015. 
6 This represents about 16.7% of the 5,165 comment letters submitted on these 73 proposals. Given our focus on the 
accounting profession, we neither collect nor categorize comment letters submitted by stakeholders outside of the 
accounting profession, which include academics, corporate preparers, and financial analysts. 
7 We sampled approximately 5% of the comment letters of the accounting profession, as a whole, to code and 
generate our labels and categories. However, we narrowed our focus to the Big 4’s comment letters to conduct 
detailed analysis. We believe we would have generated fewer categories had we focused only on Big 4 letters in our 
pilot coding. Further, we believe there is something to learn from seeing which categories the Big 4 do not 
frequently refer to as well as those that they do. 
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the original content as possible.8 For instance, we assigned the labels “flexibility,” “elections,” 
“options,” “volatility,” and “congruence” to the following sentence: 
‘We acknowledge the flexibility that results from the Board’s decision to allow the election of the 
fair value option on a contract-by-contract basis and recognize the importance this flexibility plays 
in achieving the ED’s stated objective of mitigating earnings volatility through accounting 
symmetry.’ (2006 1250-001 EY)9 
 
We continued to assign descriptive labels to comment letters until repetition of distinct 
descriptive labels was evident. A second author validated these assignments and descriptive 
labels. 
Second, we identified descriptive labels that could collapse into higher-level nodes, or 
first-level categories (Dacin et al. 2010; Miles et al. 2013). For example, we collapsed comments 
that reference different approaches, options, alternatives, and elections into one category title, 
“Approaches, options, alternatives, elections.” The grouping of the descriptive labels into higher-
level nodes produced a set of 20 first-level categories. Third, we identified conceptual links 
among first-level categories in order to collapse these into theoretically distinct clusters, or 
second-order themes, that tie into how complexity is conceptualized in our setting (Dacin et al. 
2010; Miles et al. 2013). For example, first-level categories in which comment letters refer to 
differences between GAAP and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) or industry 
standards were collapsed into a second-order theme labeled “Variation in Standards.” We 
collapsed the 20 first-level categories into seven second-order themes. Finally, we tied our 
second-order themes into the overarching theoretical dimensions of complexity – multiplicity, 
diversity, and interrelatedness (Jacobs and Swink 2011; Jacobs 2013). Table I illustrates our final 
coding structure, showing the overarching dimensions, second-order themes, and first-level 
                                                            
8 This is not necessarily a one-to-one relationship as a sentence may contain more than one distinct phrase, term, or 
description. Thus, each sentence may contain one or more descriptive labels. 
9 Comment letter references refer to the year of the FASB proposal, the FASB’s project reference followed by the 
firm writing the comment letter. 
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categories that form the basis of our analysis. 
------------------------ 
Insert Table I here 
------------------------ 
Simultaneously, we categorized the 864 comment letters into Big 4 letters, non-Big 4 
letters, and letters from professional accounting associations.10 Table II shows the count of the 
number of FASB proposals by year and the breakdown of comment letters. Consistent with prior 
research, on a relative basis, the Big 4 submit comment letters much more frequently than non-
Big 4 firms and professional associations that may not have time or resources to devote to the 
standard-setting process (Fogarty et al. 2006).11 
------------------------ 
Insert Table II here 
------------------------ 
In unreported analysis, we used Python Natural Language Toolkit (Python)12 to analyze 
the 864 comment letters and, for each comment letter, measured the following characteristics: 
extent to which the word “complexity” and its possible English variants exist (the number of 
paragraphs and words), length of the letter (the number of pages, paragraphs, and words), and 
readability (GFI). Compared to the comment letters of non-Big 4 firms and professional 
associations, comment letters of the Big 4 speak with a greater frequency and, to a greater extent, 
about complexity, are more lengthy, and less readable (i.e., are more complex).  
 Considering the Big 4’s higher submission rate of comment letters and their greater 
tendency to speak about complexity, we focused our in-depth coding on the 287 comment letters 
                                                            
10 We identify the Big 4 and non-Big 4 firms following Accounting Today’s 2014 listing of Top 100 firms.  
11 Our statement that Big 4 firms submit much more frequently than non-Big 4 firms or accounting associations is 
made on a relative basis. Each of the Big 4 firms submits a comment letter on most proposals. In contrast, there is a 
greater number of non-Big 4 firms and accounting associations that can submit comment letters yet, the number of 
comment letters actually submitted by these groups is proportionately small. 
12 http://www.nltk.org/ 
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submitted by the Big 4. Our focus on the Big 4 – Deloitte & Touche (DT), Ernst & Young (EY), 
KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) – is also consistent with prior studies demonstrating 
that these firms assume a leading role in processes of accounting change (Greenwood et al. 2002; 
Suddaby, Cooper, and Greenwood 2007).  
Data Analysis 
We analyzed the 287 comment letters submitted by the Big 4, using Python to extract 
paragraphs that speak specifically to complexity.13 We used our established first-order categories 
and second-order themes to code at the level of phrases within a paragraph discussing 
complexity so as not to miss the possibility for several categories and themes within the same 
paragraph. We sought to ensure the trustworthiness of our data by having multiple co-authors 
independently perform the coding and the assignment of categories and themes. Where there was 
disagreement, the authors discussed the coding and modified accordingly. The representative 
quotes in Table I are exemplars of the Big 4’s discourse on complexity relative to particular 
themes and categories.  
In coding the Big 4 comment letters, we capture the prevalence of discourse on 
complexity in accounting standards in terms of the number of times that each category and theme 
appears. Table III presents the frequencies at which firms discuss the overarching dimensions 
and second-order themes.  
------------------------ 
Insert Table III here 
------------------------ 
We find that firm discourse reflects all three dimensions of complexity: multiplicity, 
diversity, and interrelatedness. Within the multiplicity dimension, we observe two themes (1) the 
                                                            
13 We used Python to extract paragraphs referencing the root-word “complex*” and its English variants. This 
included searching for words such as “complex,” “complexity,” etc.  
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number of options, exemptions, or special treatments available and the extent of flexibility in 
content or format afforded by a standard (degree of choice) and (2) the amount of information 
required by a specific standard, the level of implementation guidance provided and the extent to 
which accounting constructs are adequately defined (level of clarity). Firm discourse relating to 
degree of choice was more prevalent than discourse on level of clarity.14 In relation to degree of 
choice, firms primarily discuss the number of exceptions and exemptions allowed (Table I, 1A) 
and the number of different approaches or alternatives within one standard (Table I, 1B). 
However, level of clarity was also important with firms focusing on the extent of guidance and 
rules (Table I, 2A) and the way that accounting concepts are defined (Table I, 2B).  
References to the diversity dimension are less prevalent than references to the 
multiplicity dimension. We observe that diversity in accounting standards relates to (1) 
variations in concepts and treatments across standards and uniform interpretation and application 
of standards (level of consistency) and (2) the alignment of concepts and treatments between 
different sets of standards which are available to choose from (variation in standards). Most 
often, relative to this dimension, firms discuss complexity as being linked to level of consistency 
between accounting constructs across GAAP standards (Table I, 3A) while discussion around 
differences in application/interpretation (Table I, 3B) occurs less frequently. Additionally, firms 
discuss variation in standards less frequently than most other themes, but when firms do 
comment on this it is generally in relation to GAAP and IFRS alignment (Table I, 4A).  
The interrelatedness dimension, referring to the functions that standards perform for key 
stakeholders, was slightly less prevalent than the diversity dimension. The functions we observe 
in our coding include operationality, usability, and auditability. The most common reference was 
to the theme of operationality. Operationality refers to the financial statement preparer’s ability 
                                                            
14 In untabulated results, we calculated the frequencies that first-order categories were discussed in comment letters.  
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to implement any changes required by the standard or to make the requirements of the standard 
operational in practice. Under this theme, firms discuss complexity in relation to the 
implementation of standards by preparers of financial statements and the potential costs 
associated with implementation (Table I, 5A). Usability relates to the relevance of financial 
statement information as it pertains to users for decision-making purposes (Table I, 6A). Finally, 
auditability refers to the ability of auditors to obtain and verify the information needed to 
complete their audit. The Big 4 comments on the auditability of standards occur much less 
frequently than other themes.  
Overall, Table III indicates that firms discuss all themes as they relate to accounting 
complexity but speak more frequently to a select number of themes. Our analysis indicates that 
firms most often discuss the aspects of accounting complexity related to the number of elements 
within the accounting system (degree of choice), the amount of guidance provided on accounting 
for those elements (level of clarity), whether the elements are treated in dissimilar ways across 
the system (level of consistency), and the implementation costs anticipated to arise in relation to a 
standard (operationality). The Big 4’s concerns over level of clarity and operationality align 
loosely with prior research showing that accounting firms engage in standard setting when new 
accounting and disclosure requirements are created (Puro 1984; Saemann 1999). Firm discourse 
on degree of choice and level of consistency aligns more with the notion that firms engage in the 
development of standards when proposed changes affect the extent of flexibility or 
standardization afforded by accounting standards (Puro 1984; Saemann 1999).  
  Our interpretive analysis provides insight as to how audit firms conceptualize complexity 
in accounting standards and the frequency with which the firms discuss particular issues. We 
extend this analysis to understand the ways in which the Big 4 engage with complexity in 
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accounting standard setting. To do so, two authors independently performed additional coding to 
capture (1) whether audit firms, if not neutral, support or oppose a proposed change, (2) whether 
audit firms presume a proposed change to increase, decrease, or have a mixed impact on 
accounting complexity, and (3) whether a change is perceived to affect particular stakeholders 
(Puro 1984; Saemann 1999). We use a mechanistic approach to examine trends in our coding of 
firm discourse as well as consistency in that discourse on the dimensions of complexity. Finally, 
we consider the implications of our analysis for complexity in accounting standards. 
IV. AUDIT FIRM ENGAGEMENT WITH COMPLEXITY 
Prior research suggests a link between the issues underlying the changes proposed by the 
FASB and the positions taken by the accounting firms (Brown 1981; Puro 1984; Saemann 1999; 
Allen et al. 2013; 2014). In our examination of audit firms’ support for or opposition to proposed 
changes to accounting standards, we find their opposition to proposed changes is generally much 
more prevalent than their support. The Big 4 generally do not support proposed changes that they 
perceive will affect the complexity of accounting standards (Table III). 
Audit firms’ lack of support for proposed changes to standards is linked to whether they 
view the proposed change as increasing or decreasing complexity. The Big 4 perceive a 
significant number of the changes proposed by the FASB to increase the complexity of 
accounting standards. Table IV, Panel A shows the relation between audit firms perceiving a 
change as either increasing or decreasing complexity and whether they oppose, support, or take a 
neutral position toward the change. Audit firms perceive 66.7 percent of FASB proposals as 
increasing complexity and oppose such proposals 98.8 percent of the time. Firm discourse 
indicating opposition to proposed changes that increase complexity speaks most often to: degree 
of choice, level of consistency, and operationality (Table IV, Panel B). For instance, EY opposed 
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a proposed change affecting degree of choice because the firm: 
‘…believe[s] that debt securities should not be in the scope of the proposed standard. We 
generally believe there are enough differences between loans and debt securities to warrant 
retaining today’s separate credit impairment model for debt securities.’ (2012 260 EY)  
In the previous quote, firm discourse reveals opposition to a change that would increase 
complexity by reducing the number of alternatives afforded under the standard. This is because 
the firm believes the financial statement elements to which the alternatives would be applied to 
be sufficiently different.  
------------------------ 
Insert Table IV here 
------------------------ 
That the number of alternatives afforded within accounting standards (degree of choice) 
(i.e., multiplicity) matters to firms is compatible with Saemann (1999). While Saemann (1999) 
suggests that accounting firms generally oppose changes that increase the number of alternatives 
afforded (i.e., multiplicity), our analysis found this opposition to be more nuanced. For this 
reason, we do not presume directionality in the relationship between our dimensions and 
increases or decreases in complexity. 
Our results also suggest that accounting firms are concerned with diversity, through 
inconsistency across standards (level of consistency), and with interrelatedness, in terms of 
whether changes to standards are operational. For example, KPMG opposed a proposed change 
affecting level of consistency indicating that: 
‘…by not applying the guidance in the proposed standard to… insurance contracts that are similar 
to financial guarantee contracts, the appropriate accounting model for these other contracts 
becomes unclear.’ (2007 1530 KPMG)  
This suggests a concern that lack of consistency in accounting models applied to similar 
contracts would add complexity to accounting standards. Likewise, DT opposed a proposed 
change affecting operationality for certain entities as: 
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‘…providing sensitivity disclosures [for fair value measurements of equity instruments] may 
prove challenging for certain reporting entities that do not currently provide this information or do 
not have it readily available (e.g., they may be required to upgrade their systems).’ (2009 1710-
100 DT) 
In relation to this proposed change on fair value disclosures, DT opposed what it viewed as an 
increase in complexity stemming from preparers potential difficulties in implementing the 
change. 
Overall, as shown in Table IV, Panel A, audit firms perceive fewer proposed changes to 
be decreasing complexity (23.3 percent). Relative to these changes, audit firms’ discourse is 
generally supportive (96.7 percent). Firms most frequently discuss their support for decreases in 
accounting complexity in association with level of clarity (Table IV, Panel B). For example, DT 
noted that:  
‘…determining market under the general guidance on using lower of cost or market requires the 
use of a complex set of paths involving ceilings and floors. Accordingly, we suggest that 
inventories subsequently be measured at the lower of cost or net realizable value.’ (2014 210 DT) 
This comment shows support for reducing what DT perceives to be overly complicated or 
mechanical rules. However, this seems to contradict Puro’s (1984) assertion that firms primarily 
support changes that result in new client services such as those requiring new or more detailed 
accounting and disclosure. This might be explained by the contemporary articulation of 
complexity as a problem to be constrained. Prior to 2014, the year the FASB Simplification 
Initiative formally began, we observe that audit firms perceive almost all changes to increase 
complexity; however, after 2014, firms perceive a number of proposed changes to decrease 
complexity in accounting standards. Thus, in recent years, it seems that audit firms’ view the 
FASB’s Simplification Initiative to decrease complexity in accounting standards and support 
these efforts.  
Effects of Accounting Change on Stakeholders 
Research posits an association between the positions taken by accounting firms and the 
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stakeholders that firms perceive proposed FASB changes to affect (Puro 1984; Saemann 1999; 
Allen et al. 2013, 2014). We coded audit firm discourse for whether a proposed change to an 
accounting standard is perceived to affect preparers, users, and/or audit firms (Tandy and 
Wilburn 1992; Saemann 1999). As we code at the level of phrases within a paragraph discussing 
complexity, it is likely that firms articulate their concerns in terms of more than one type of 
stakeholder within the same paragraph. Table IV, Panel C shows when a change is presumed to 
increase or decrease complexity, the extent to which firms’ refer to certain types of stakeholders.  
When audit firms perceive FASB proposals as increasing complexity, they view the 
change as affecting preparers 64.0 percent of the time, users 48.8 percent of the time, and 
auditors 9.3 percent of the time. These results align with Saemann’s (1999) research indicating 
that preparer concerns surpass user considerations in accounting firm discourse. However, when 
audit firms perceive proposals as decreasing in complexity, we note a trend towards audit firms 
viewing the change as affecting users (40.0 percent of the time) more often than preparers (33.3 
percent of the time). Further, the low level of concern for auditors as stakeholders diverges from 
Allen et al. (2013, 2014) who indicate that litigation and regulatory scrutiny are important factors 
that may influence firms’ views. 
Our analysis suggests firms not only consider whether the change will increase or 
decrease complexity but also consider specific components of complexity when discussing how a 
change will affect particular stakeholder groups. We focus on changes that firms perceive to 
affect preparers considering that audit firms perceive changes to affect preparers more often than 
they perceive changes to affect other stakeholders. Table IV, Panel D reveals that firm discourse 
on how complexity affects financial statement preparers relates mainly to changes that affect 
degree of choice, level of clarity, level of consistency, and operationality. Our results indicate 
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that, in terms of changes that affect preparers, audit firms highlight the flexibility aspect (degree 
of choice) of multiplicity more than other complexity themes. An example of this is seen in 
PwC’s support for reducing complexity by introducing the option for preparers to perform a 
qualitative assessment of goodwill. According to PwC: 
‘…the use of a qualitative assessment could result in an entity not having to measure the fair value 
of an indefinite-lived intangible asset in certain circumstances... This should contribute to reduced 
cost and complexity of performing an impairment test for those assets.’ (2012 100 PwC) 
Again, this contradicts the work of Allen et al. (2013, 2014) that suggests audit firm positions are 
not influenced by flexibility and choice afforded to their clients.  
Our results also suggest that firms are concerned with diversity for preparers brought on 
by differences in concepts and treatments across standards (level of consistency), and with 
proposals that impact the ability of preparers to put changes to standards into practice 
(operationality). Indeed, firm discourse indicates regular opposition to proposed changes that 
affect operationality for preparers. For example, KPMG opposed a proposed change that the firm 
perceived to increase complexity for preparers in the accounting for post-retirement benefits due 
to its costs of compliance and implementation. 
‘We question whether the information about cash flows […] is readily available from many 
actuarial systems and, therefore, whether the Board underestimates the complexity and cost of 
compliance, as they relate to compiling, analyzing, and auditing the information.' (2003 1025-200 
KPMG)  
As such, where Allen et al. (2013, 2014) find no evidence linking auditor engagement in 
standard setting to preparer’s preferences, our paper appears to tell a different story. We find that 
while firm discourse includes the interests of preparers, users, and auditors, firms seem to 
emphasize preparer interests more often than the interests of other stakeholders. The tendency to 
highlight the effects of proposed changes for preparers speaks to the concern of McKee, 
Williams, and Frazier (1991) and others that audit firms engage in issues they perceive to affect 
preparers. As preparers are also current or potential clients, there is some question as to whether 
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audit firms ultimately remain objective and free of conflicts of interest with their public mandate 
(McKee et al. 1991). On the one hand, client relations and audit fee considerations may sway 
firm discourse. On the other hand, firms may see themselves as subject matter experts 
contributing technical knowledge to the development of standards, a tension that our analysis 
cannot unravel. While we leave the exploration of individual firm interests for further research, 
we do analyze the ways in which consistency or lack of consistency in audit firm discourse may 
impact complexity in accounting standards. We do so by examining the level of consistency in 
firm discourse on the root causes (i.e. specific dimensions and underlying themes) that firms 
perceive to impact complexity. Our analysis helps us to understand how consistency, or the lack 
thereof, may contribute to complexity in accounting standards.  
Effects of Audit Firm Discourse on Accounting Complexity 
The accounting profession makes claims to accounting expertise in commenting on 
accounting policy, interpreting accounting standards, and verifying their application (Malsch and 
Gendron 2009; Power and Gendron 2015). In making these claims, much research on the 
accounting profession accords a common voice to the profession, and particularly to the Big 4 
(Humphrey et al. 2009; Ramirez 2012), which would suggest consistency in their contributions. 
Indeed, each of the Big 4 participates to a similar extent in the standard-setting process. 
Furthermore, the audit firms have all encouraged the FASB to implement a complexity 
framework and to standardize the way the FASB will identify, evaluate, and mitigate complexity.  
While our analysis did not entail quantifying the extent of consistency in discourse within 
each firm, our qualitative and interpretive approach provides initial evidence that a firm’s 
internal discourse is generally consistent. In other words, when expressing support or opposition 
to a proposed change, an audit firm mobilizes themes consistently across standards. Therefore, 
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individual audit firms hold consistent views of accounting problems and resolutions. This 
suggests that contributions, by individual firms, to the way standards develop are harmonious, 
and that comment letters may be centrally prepared.  
However, considering the technical nature and sophistication of accounting problems and 
their resolutions (Gendron 2000), some inherent or even deliberate complexity in the 
development of accounting standards may be expected (Larson 1977). Taking into account that 
individual audit firm’s private interests may change the way a specific firm engages in 
accounting issues and proposed solutions (Puro 1984), inconsistent contributions to the 
development of accounting standards on a cross-firm basis may exist. Thus, we examine 
between-firm consistency and its potential impact on the way in which accounting complexity 
develops.  
Between-firm Consistency 
We analyzed consistency in discourse between audit firms in relation to their positions on 
complexity in accounting standards and the dimensions of complexity (and their underlying 
themes).We find that between-firm discourse is mostly consistent in terms of audit firms’ 
positions in support of or in opposition to a proposed change. For instance, Table V, Panel A 
shows that firms’ support or opposition to a proposed change is consistent in 65.7 percent of 
proposals. We also analyze between-firm views of a proposal’s perceived impact, meaning 
whether a proposed change will increase or decrease complexity in an accounting standard. In 
the majority of instances, the Big 4 agree about whether a proposed change increases or 
decreases complexity. However, Table V, Panel B indicates that audit firms differ in their 
opinions regarding the proposed change’s impact on complexity in about 37.1 percent of the 
proposals. These rates of inconsistency are not trivial.  
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------------------------ 
Insert Table V here 
------------------------ 
 
We consider cross-firm discourse to be consistent when there is complete agreement that 
a particular aspect of complexity is (or is not) a root cause of complexity. This suggests that if all 
(or none) of the firms commenting on a standard consider degree of choice as a root cause of 
complexity in a proposed standard, then firm discourse is consistent. In contrast, if some firms 
consider degree of choice to be a root cause of complexity, then firm discourse is inconsistent. 
As reflected in Table V, Panel C, we note greater inconsistency than consistency between firms’ 
perceptions about which dimensions and themes affect complexity (i.e., the root causes). 
Perhaps, not surprisingly, firm discourse tends to be at its most consistent when audit firms 
perceive auditability to affect the complexity of a proposed standard; however, firms identify 
auditability as an aspect of complexity much less frequently than any other theme. In contrast, 
firm discourse tends to be at its most inconsistent when audit firms perceive complexity in 
proposed standards as relating to diversity (level of consistency). Additionally, audit firm 
discourse exhibits inconsistency when firms perceive complexity as relating to the other aspect 
of diversity (variation in standards), to both aspects of multiplicity (degree of choice, level of 
clarity) and to two functions of standards (operationality, usability). Indeed, inconsistency is not 
uncommon.  
Furthermore, analysis of the Big 4’s discourse around these themes, indicates their 
understanding of root causes is not homogenous. For instance, KPMG supported a proposed 
change affecting disclosures of going concern entities as the firm perceived it would decrease 
complexity by requiring more useful and understandable information (usability) and produce a 
requirement that would be easier for preparers to apply (operationality):  
'We believe initiating disclosure at the "reasonably likely" threshold would provide users with 
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important information on a more-timely basis to assist them in forming their views about the 
uncertainty. […] We believe a single 24-month initial disclosure assessment period using a 
"reasonably likely" threshold would be more understandable and less complex to apply. […] A 
24-month horizon using a "reasonably likely" threshold would be applied more consistently 
and provide more timely, decision-useful information to investors.' (2013-300 KPMG)  
In contrast, DT’s discourse on the same proposal for going concern disclosure indicates 
opposition to the proposal as the firm perceives the change to increase complexity by being less 
understandable to financial statement users (usability) and making the appropriate disclosure 
difficult for the preparer to determine (operationality). According to DT:  
'The proposed ASU adds complexity by artificially incorporating multiple levels in the 
determination of whether some form of financial statement disclosure is required with respect 
to an entity's going-concern presumption. […]. While some delineation is warranted, we 
question whether all of these differentiations are necessary. As a result of such differentiation, 
determining the appropriate disclosure for the preparer, and auditing it, may be unnecessarily 
complex under the proposed ASU and may result in inconsistent application, which could 
ultimately confuse financial statement users.’ (2013-300 DT)  
This is an example in which neither of the firm’s positions, perceived impact, nor identified root 
causes of complexity were in alignment.  
Therefore, while discourse across audit firms generally is consistent in terms of whether 
firms support or oppose a proposed change and whether that change increases or decreases 
accounting complexity, we find that firms do not hold uniform opinions as to the root causes 
(dimensions and themes) driving complexity. Thus, what is understood by audit firms to affect 
the development of accounting standards, and to make them more or less complex, does not 
appear to be based on any “objective facts” but rather socially constructed (Alvesson 1993). 
Jacobs and Swink (2011, 677) put forth that “it is the effective management of complexity that 
poses the difficulty.” If the audit firms themselves have different opinions as to what creates 
complexity, their engagement in standard setting potentially contributes to complexity in 
standards by not managing their views or presenting a unified understanding of the root causes of 
complexity, and its effects on particular stakeholders. By extension, differences in opinion over 
complexity in accounting standards may also impact audit firms’ perceptions on appropriate 
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techniques for addressing complexity in the audit.  
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 With a focus on discursive engagement with accounting standards, this paper investigates 
the accounting profession’s, and in particular the Big 4’s, comment letter submissions on FASB 
proposals issued during the period from 2003 to 2014. In particular, we focus on the discourse 
around accounting complexity observed in the comment letters to develop an understanding of 
the ways in which audit firms characterize complexity in accounting standards.  
 Our analysis reveals that firms characterize complexity in several ways. Specifically, 
firms conceptualize complexity along three main dimensions: multiplicity, diversity, and 
interrelatedness. The multiplicity dimension points to characteristics of accounting standards that 
affect the number of accounting elements and choices available within accounting standards. 
Diversity indicates the degree to which accounting elements are treated in the same way across 
standards. Finally, interrelatedness represents the extent to which accounting elements serve 
different purposes or functions. Underlying these dimensions are several themes and categories 
of discourse that firms associate with complexity in accounting standards. Conceptualizing audit 
firm discourse on complexity allows us to provide a framework for the future study of 
accounting complexity.  
 Overall, we find that audit firms oppose, rather than support, a greater number of changes 
proposed by the FASB. Firms’ opposition to proposed changes is related to their perception that 
changes will: (1) increase, rather than decrease, complexity, and (2) affect preparers more often 
than users and auditors. We noted consistency in firm discourse across the proposed changes in 
relation to whether firms support or oppose a change and whether firms agree the change would 
increase or decrease complexity. However, we find that firms are inconsistent in their discourse 
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when we consider their perceptions of the root causes (i.e., dimensions and themes) that underlie 
complexity. 
 Thus, while the Big 4 may agree on certain aspects of complexity in accounting 
standards, we do not find unity and harmony in their discourse surrounding complexity in 
accounting standards. For instance, while the Big 4 tend to agree that the level of consistency 
affects complexity, they do not generally agree on how or why a proposed change would affect 
the level of consistency. Such inconsistency in firm discourse around complexity occurs 
frequently enough that it may, in and of itself, construct accounting complexity. As meanings 
and beliefs underlying controllability of the audit are multiple and never entirely fixed (Gendron 
and Spira 2009), so are meanings underlying what is and what is not complex; complexity seems 
continuously subject to contest.15 As such, the Big 4’s conceptualization of complexity parallels 
that of Malsch and Gendron’s (2009) work on financial practitioners’ vacillating movements 
between inconsistent and sometimes contradictory thought, demonstrated through multiple lines 
of thought expressed in specific contexts. 
Our analysis indicates that, depending on the firms’ perceptions of the proposed standard 
and the impact the standard may have on particular stakeholders, their discourse can be 
inconsistent. We find that discourse around increases in complexity is often associated with the 
interests of preparers, or potential clients of the audit firms. Audit firm engagement in standard 
setting may involve rationalization of preparer interests; however, this is not merely a story of 
commercialism at odds with professionalism. While complexity might be presented as “natural” 
and professional expertise indispensable in dealing with complexity in accounting, the 
                                                            
15 We would argue that this finding is consistent with the research of Donelson, McInnis, and Mergenthaler (2016) 
who argue that “it is difficult to perfectly separate rules-based characteristics of the standard from both the 
complexity of the standard and the characteristics of the underlying transaction, including the complexity of the 
transaction.” 
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profession’s varied interests in engaging in accounting policy processes may also affect the 
profession’s views on the accounting issues proposed. Therefore, the value added in this paper is 
in its focus on the varying discourses of the Big 4’s engagement with accounting standards. 
These varying discourses enhance our understanding of the development of accounting standards 
by specifying how dominant actors’ discourse around complexity is socially constructed (Malsch 
and Gendron 2011). Future research could further explore within-firm consistency and build on 
our exploratory work to study how potential non-uniformity in discourse affects other aspects of 
the development of standards. 
 Research has argued that it may be easier for the large audit firms to sway accounting 
debates in accordance with their commercial or private interests, especially considering the 
power fashioned by these firms’ global resources and reach (Malsch and Gendron 2011). Many 
of the participants in accounting debates are themselves auditors and accountants or those, like 
regulators and investors, closely related to the world of professional accountancy (Power 2011). 
Staffing accounting policy-making bodies with highly experienced auditors constitutes a 
foothold by which the profession’s discourses, internalized through many years of experience in 
public accounting, can act upon and influence policy decisions (Malsch and Gendron 2011). As 
such, discursive influence represents a level of power that should not be ignored in accounting 
policy debates (Malsch and Gendron 2011) and which we highlight by taking a critical view of 
comment letters.  
Overall, our findings indicate that audit firms are “conflicted intermediaries” in the 
articulation of complexity in standards. Audit firms might be considered intermediaries in 
accounting standard setting, “providing assistance to regulators and/or targets, drawing on their 
own capabilities, authority, and legitimacy” (Abbott, Levi-Faur, and Snidal 2017, 6) to 
35 
understand accounting problems and weigh resolutions to those problems. Yet these actions are 
potentially “conflicted” in the sense that an audit firm’s views on accounting problems and 
resolutions might advantage preparer concerns over the firm’s own economic interests in 
sustaining complexity or the broader interests of financial statement users. We think this notion 
is important to highlight as a way to encourage more reflexive thinking around complexity and 
how it may be artificially sustained through networks of statements, technologies, and supporters 
(Malsch et al. 2017). 
At the same time, we must acknowledge certain limitations associated with our results. 
First, our focus on a select set of accounting proposals, not the entire population of FASB 
proposals during our period of study, may have skewed our results. The proposals that we did not 
include would more than likely reflect even greater complexity discourse, considering the 
convergence projects discuss major issues and differences between GAAP and IFRS for which 
there is no clear and easy answer. Furthermore, although discourse on complexity has been 
present in accounting standard setting for much longer, the FASB Simplification Initiative only 
formally began in 2014 and continues into the contemporary period. As such, we note that 
following this initiative over time may be an interesting extension for future research, as well as 
focusing on the social construction of accounting complexity on a global level. 
 In addition, our study was largely motivated by the contemporary and popular debates on 
complexity that we found to be pervasive in our analysis of Big 4 comment letters. At the same 
time, we collected comment letters from mid- and small-tier audit firms as well as professional 
accounting associations that indicate that these factions of the profession perhaps speak about 
complexity in a different way or even speak about other features of complexity. While the Big 4 
hold a powerful position in the accounting regulatory space, the beliefs and practices of these 
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firms cannot merely be extrapolated to other actors in the accounting profession (Lander et al. 
2013). Future research could explore differences in the way that mid- or small-tier firms 
conceptualize complexity or help to identify issues that are imperative to mid- or small-tier firms 
as compared to Big 4 firms. Perhaps the work of Lander et al. (2013), indicating that 
commitment to traditional professional ideals is considerably stronger within groupings of more 
locally grounded firms, could serve as the basis for such an endeavor.  
 Notwithstanding the number of standards and the sub-set of actors that were the object of 
examination, this study contains important implications for accounting standard setting. We 
contribute a rich understanding of how audit firms engage in the development of standards and 
articulate accounting issues. In the articulation of accounting issues, standard setters might 
demand more transparency in audit firm discourse and question the preferences exhibited by 
audit firms. If the mandate for auditors is to operate in the interest of the public, even if that 
means in the interest of public company investors, then their discourse surrounding complexity 
might indicate as much. Instead, we find audit firms frequently speak to complexity from the 
preparer’s perspective, which seemingly contradicts not only the audit firms’ public interest 
mandate but also the standard setter’s focus on user (i.e., investor) decision-making. We suggest 
that audit firms and standard setters reflect more on the power of complexity and consider the 
role of this powerful construct within a standard-setting process claiming to accumulate 
accounting information that is useful for users of financial statements. 
  Our results encourage further exploration of accounting standards on several other fronts. 
For instance, more work could be done on not only audit firms’ or the accounting profession’s 
role in the construction of accounting complexity, but also on understanding the role that other 
powerful stakeholders play in the construction of accounting issues, problems, and standards. In 
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addition, with a focus on accounting standard proposals, rather than accounting standards 
enacted, our study does not speak explicitly to the firms’ influence on moving a proposal to an 
actual standard. Future research might follow Pelger (2016) and focus on the way in which 
comment letter processes may limit the potential of stakeholders, including audit firms, to shape 
standard setter’s final decision processes or, relative to this study, the level of complexity in 
accounting standards. In the audit context, engagement in field-based research aiming to study 
how auditors construct complexity in action, not least when they carry out audit engagements 
and negotiate with audit clients, is also relevant. 
 In closing, audit firms’ engagement with standards does not take place in a vacuum and 
political, economic, and environmental factors may further affect the nature of their engagement 
in the standard-setting process. However, we should not assume that audit firms or other 
stakeholders merely “go through the motions” of engaging in comment letter submissions. Our 
analysis suggests that researchers should give more credence to studies of the processes by which 
actors engage in the development of accounting standards and, ultimately, how those processes 
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Dimensions of Complexity  
 
Overarching dimensions, second-order themes, and first-level categories 
Overarching Dimension: Multiplicity  
1. Degree of Choice Representative Data from Comment Letters 
 
A. Exceptions, exemptions, special 
treatments, conditions 
 “While we recognize that beneficial interests in securitized financial assets are complex and may differ from other financial 
instruments we do not believe such differences warrant exception treatment.” (2009 1740-100 PwC) 
“… we do not support the proposed Statement's elimination of an entity's ability to hedge specific risks (with certain exceptions) 
or to designate a hedge at its discretion” (2008 1590-100 Deloitte) 
 
B. Approaches, options, 
alternatives, elections 
“…we would be supportive of developing an EPS model that … moves toward the elimination of differing methods of 
computing dilution for economically similar instruments.” (2005 1240-001 PwC) 
“… additionally, we believe that the approach in the proposed ASU may actually make the goodwill impairment test more 
confusing and complex by adding an optional more-likely-than-not assessment prior to the application of the current impairment 
test.” (2011 180 KPMG) 
 
C. Flexibility to evaluate, decide 
content/format of FS 
“Because the definition of near term in SOP 94-6 is consistent with the extant definition of reasonable period of time in AU 
Section 341, the inclusion of an open-ended time horizon for an assessment of an entity’s ability to continue as a going concern 
may cause undue complexity for management and confusion for users of financial statements.” (2008 1650-100 KPMG) 
“…we believe that the details of reclassifications out of AOCI should be able to be presented in the footnotes…. we do not 
believe presentation of reclassification adjustments into net income whether on the face of the financial statements or through 
footnote disclosure should be required” (2011 240 EY) 
2. Level of Clarity  
 
A. Detailed implementation 
guidance, bright line rules 
“ …there is a risk that constituents will interpret the examples too narrowly… we are not suggesting that the Board consider 
removing the implementation guidance, but … the examples can be improved to provide guidance for more complex situations 
that require considerably more judgment in applying the guidance” (2008 1620-100 KPMG) 
“…the more difficult applications may be in situations involving multiple contingencies of various classes and types (and the 
potential aggregation of certain of those contingencies), we recommend that the Board provide additional application examples 
involving more complex scenarios” (2010 1840-100 PwC) 
 
B. (Re) definition of constructs or 
conceptual improvements 
“…we are concerned that the proposed definition may exclude some entities that the Board may not intend to exclude… it is 
necessary to address the current inconsistencies and complexity of retaining multiple definitions of a nonpublic entity and public 
entity within U.S generally accepted accounting principles” (2013 310 KPMG) 
“… the concept of extraordinary items should be eliminated from U.S. GAAP along with the requirement for entities to 
separately present such items on the income statement and disclose them in the footnotes. Eliminating the concept should 
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improve the efficiency of the financial reporting process …” (2014 220 Deloitte) 
 
C. Level of detail in FS and 
Footnotes 
“enhance disclosures allow financial statement users to understand the nature of credit risk within an entity's portfolio, how the 
entity analyzes and assesses this risk in determining the appropriate allowance for credit losses, and the reasons for changes in the 
portfolio and the related allowance for credit losses. However, we do not believe that the extent and complexity of disclosures … 
is necessary” (2009 1700-100 KPMG) 
Overarching Dimension: Diversity  
3. Level of Consistency  
 
A. Congruence between concepts 
and/or standards 
“… the proposal amendment does not address many of the challenges that are prevalent in the application of FIN 46(R). It also 
introduces a new control concept, which has inconsistencies with other existing control concepts, and adds complexity to 
financial reporting.” (2008 1610-100 PwC) 
 
“… definition of a financial guarantee insurance contract… is broader than in … FASB Statement 133…. a financial guarantee 
insurance contract might be within the scope of both the proposed Statement and Statement 133. … a contract could meet the 
criteria for a derivative and not be within the paragraph 10(d) exclusion in Statement 133 and also be within the scope of the 
proposed Statement. ... consider making the definitions in the proposed Statement and …Statement 133 the same. Use of 






“.. presenting an operation as discontinued if a reporting entity has significant continuing operations and cash flows with the 
discontinued operation would not address concerns about the complexity of the existing standard and its inconsistent application” 
(2013 230 EY) 
“… a number of ambiguities and inconsistencies in the proposed guidance. In order to avoid inappropriate interpretation and 
inconsistent application of the criteria, … there should be consistency between the proposed offsetting criteria, defined concepts 
and related application guidance” (2011 100 KPMG) 
 
C. Comprehensive effort versus 
partial or subset 
“…we support a comprehensive reconsideration of the accounting for all aspects of postretirement benefit costs … changing this 
one component of periodic cost would add unnecessary complexity” (2003 1025-300 KPMG) 
“… retaining multiple, inconsistent concepts of kick-out rights within the consolidation literature will contribute to complexity in 
applying the overall consolidation model… the Board should undertake a separate project and address the application of kick out 
rights for all types of entities” (2008 1620-100 EY) 
4. Variation in Standards  
 
A. GAAP and IFRS/Other 
“… proposal states that many of its disclosure requirements are similar to the requirements in IFRS 7; however, there are a 
number of notable differences. We encourage the Board to deliberate with the IASB to determine whether there are opportunities 
to further converge these disclosure requirements” (2012 200 Deloitte) 
“… continue to work with the IASB to seek harmonization of application guidance and avoid the confusion that would result 
from having two models that similar in principle but applied differently in practice” (2013 220 KPMG) 
 
 B. Industry standards, guidance “…concerned about the issuance of new specialized industry standards (unless such guidance addresses transactions unique to that industry) and their contribution to the increasing complexity of GAAP….accounting standards should be based on the 
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transaction or activity for which accounting guidance is needed and not based on the particular industry in which the entity 
operates” (2007 1530-100 Deloitte) 
 
“… a single investment company standard should be used to define "investing entities" of all types… A single investment 
company standard would then govern which types of entities would qualify for fair value accounting” (2011-210 PwC)
Overarching Dimension: Interrelatedness  
5. Operationality of Standards   
 
A. Implementation cost prohibitive 
to preparer  
 “…efforts to improve disclosures by obtaining input from a variety of preparers of financial statements about the operational 
aspects of the sensitivity analysis, including the complexity and costs of preparing the proposed disclosures. Providing sensitivity 
disclosures may prove challenging for certain reporting entities that do not currently provide this information or do not have it 
readily available (e.g., they may be required to upgrade their systems” (2009 1710-100 Deloitte) 
“… efforts to reduce the costs and complexity of applying the current goodwill impairment guidance… We observe that many 
companies spend considerable time and incur substantial costs to perform their goodwill impairment tests, and that it is not clear 
whether users receive commensurate benefits” (2011-180 PwC) 
 
B. Availability/Reliability of 
Evidence/Estimates 
“…we question whether the information about cash flows … is readily available from many actuarial systems and… whether the 
Board underestimates the complexity and cost of compliance, as they relate to compiling, analyzing, and auditing the 
information” (2003 1025-200 KPMG) 
 
C. Understandable, acceptable 
concepts, treatments 
“… we understand the purpose for discussing the concept of certainty-equivalent cash flows … we are concerned that some may 
find the discussion confusing. In addition, the result of such an approach in a multi-period scenario is sometimes 
counterintuitive” (2004 1201-100 EY) 
“… we understand the theoretical appeal of such information in assessing an entity's quality of earnings, disclosing a range of 
other "acceptable" values that could reasonably have been recorded by the Company as of the measurement date could be 
misleading. Assessing various indications of value and determining the point estimate that is deemed to be the most 
representative of fair value is judgmental and frequently complex” (2009 1710-100 EY)
6. Usability of Standards   
 
A. Relevant information for 
decision making 
“…we would be supportive of developing an EPS model that better reflects the economic dilution of complex instruments to 
current shareholders and moves toward the elimination of differing methods of computing dilution for economically similar 
instruments” (2005 1240-001 PwC) 
“… may seem that the correct answer to this question is automatically to disclose all gains and losses on a gross basis, this type 
of disclosure may actually confuse the user of the financial statements as the user will not have all of the detailed information 
required to determine how the gross amounts were calculated. … the users of the financial statements are most interested in 
understanding the net effect of how the impacted income statement line item has been altered” (2007 1510-100 EY) 
 
B. Understandable, acceptable 
concepts, treatments 
“… use of multiple effective dates adds unnecessary complexity to the transition provisions and will result in confusion among 
financial statement users. … we believe it will be difficult to explain to users of their financial statements why the adoption of a 
new accounting standard has an effect on the financial statements in two successive periods” (2003 1025-300 EY) 
“Having different requirements for entities whose financial statements are "widely distributed" versus for those whose financial 
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statements are not will, in our view, create unnecessary complexity, potentially confuse financial statement users, and provide 
little, if any, incremental benefit” (2010 1760-100 PwC) 
 
C. Subjectivity, volatility, 
unpredictability 
“We believe that developing accounting guidance in this area that differs from existing auditing standards will result in 
unnecessary complexity in financial reporting and will not serve the interests of users of financial statements. Rather, it creates 
unnecessary complexities in financial reporting by allowing for the possibility for management and auditors to reach different 
conclusions using the same information and judgments about the future.” (2008 1650-100 EY) 
7. Auditability of Standards   
 
A. Availability/Reliability of 
Evidence/Estimates 
“…we question whether the information about cash flows … is readily available from many actuarial systems and… whether the 
Board underestimates the complexity and cost of compliance, as they relate to compiling, analyzing, and auditing the 
information” (2003 1025-200 KPMG) 
“ …we question the procedures available to an auditor to corroborate the information (or lack thereof) in the financial statement 
footnotes without attorneys providing adequate information to auditors. … may result in disclosure that likely defaults to simply 
considering only the asserted amount of the claim" (2010 1840-100 EY) 
 
B. Litigation Concerns 
“ …proposed statement assumes that the amount of the claim is an objective amount that is publicly available. This is not the 
case for many lawsuits… Without an objective claim amount … would require disclosure of the best estimate of the maximum 
exposure to loss…this amount may be highly useful to the disclosing entity's adversaries. … given the complexity and 
unpredictability of the litigation process, this disclosure could itself be the source of litigation if the ultimate resolution of the 
contingency differs materially from the disclosed estimates” (2008 1600-100 EY) 
 C. Enforcement of Standards/Links 
to Regulators 
No passages coded 
Table I reflects the aggregation of our first-level categories (i.e., letters) and second-order themes (i.e., numbers) into (three) overarching dimensions of 
complexity. In addition, Table I provides examples of the representative data from comment letters that we coded under the first-level categories.
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TABLE II 
FASB Proposals and Comment Letters 
 








2003 7 26 12 26 64 
2004 2 8 3 15 26 
2005 7 28 15 31 74 
2006 3 11 8 19 38 
2007 1 4 0 3 7 
2008 7 28 22 39 89 
2009 8 31 19 19 69 
2010 7 31 35 29 95 
2011 7 27 27 29 83 
2012 6 24 26 36 86 
2013 10 38 37 50 125 
2014 8 31 30 47 108 
Total Submitted 73 287 234 343 864 
 
Table II presents the number of FASB proposals on new or revised statements by the year in which the proposal was 
issued and the corresponding number of comment letters by accounting profession type. It is possible that 
accounting firms or professional associations submitted more than one letter on each proposal.  
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TABLE III 
Frequency of Complexity Codes 
 
    % of Letters   Support% Oppose% Neutral%   Decrease% Increase% Mixed% 
Overarching Dimension: Multiplicity                      76.7%   18.6% 55.0% 3.1%   17.8% 50.4% 8.5% 
1. Degree of Choice 56.6%   11.6% 44.2% 0.8%   10.1% 39.5% 7.0% 
2. Level of Clarity 50.4%   13.2% 34.9% 2.3%   13.2% 33.3% 3.9% 
                    
Overarching Dimension: Diversity                          68.2%   17.8% 49.6% 0.8%   17.1% 45.0% 6.2% 
3. Level of Consistency 51.9%   10.9% 40.3% 0.8%   10.1% 36.4% 5.4% 
4. Variation in Standards 36.5%   10.9% 25.6% 0.0%   10.9% 23.3% 2.3% 
                      
Overarching Dimension: Interrelatedness              64.4%   15.5% 48.1% 0.8%   14.7% 45.0% 4.7% 
5. Operationality of Standards 51.2%   8.5% 41.9% 0.8%   8.5% 39.5% 3.1% 
6. Usability of Standards 38.0%   11.6% 26.4% 0.0%   10.9% 24.0% 3.1% 
7. Auditability of Standards 15.6%   1.6% 14.0% 0.0%   1.6% 13.2% 0.8% 
Table III reflects the frequency that each dimension and second-order theme appears in our coding of comment letters, as well as how the frequency distributes 
across the Big 4’s positions and perceived impact on complexity. This table can be read as follows. Degree of Choice appears in 56.6% of letters coded. Audit 
firms oppose proposals affecting degree of choice in 44.2% of the letters coded. Audit firms associate Degree of Choice with increases in complexity in 39.5% of 
the letters coded. Note that the total for a dimension (e.g., Multiplicity = 76.7%) does not equal the total of the underlying themes (e.g., Degree of Choice = 
56.6%; Level of Clarity = 50.4%) and the total of the three dimensions does not equal 100% since a comment letter can discuss complexity along various themes 




Features of Audit Firm Engagement 
 
Panel A: Relationship between Position and Perceived Impact  
 Increase (66.7% of Letters) 
Decrease 
(23.3% of Letters) 
Mixed 
(10.0% of Letters) 
Oppose 98.8% 3.3% 53.8% 
Support 0.0% 96.7% 15.4% 
Neutral 1.2% 0.0% 30.8% 
Panel A indicates the percentage of comment letters that audit firms perceive as increasing, decreasing, or mixed 
complexity. Conditional on this percentage, this table reports the extent to which, when audit firms perceive a 
change as either increasing or decreasing complexity, or having a mixed affect, they also oppose, support, or are 
neutral towards the proposed change. This table can be read as: 66.7% of comment letters identify a proposed 
change to increase complexity; of these letters, 98.8% of them oppose the proposed changes.  
 







Degree of Choice 60.0% 44.8% 
Level of Clarity 49.4% 55.2% 
Level of Consistency 55.3% 41.4% 
Variation in Standards 35.3% 44.8% 
Operationality of Standards 58.8% 37.9% 
Usability of Standards 36.5% 48.3% 
Auditability of Standards 20.0% 6.9% 
Panel B indicates the extent to which, when audit firms speak to a particular theme, they perceive a proposed change 
as either increasing or decreasing complexity. This table can be read as: in proposals where firms perceive the 
proposed change to increase complexity and they oppose this increase, 60.0% of them discuss Degree of Choice as a 
root cause of complexity. In proposals where firms perceive the proposed change to decrease complexity and they 
support this decrease, 44.8% of them discuss Degree of Choice as a root cause of complexity. 
 
Panel C: Relationship between Affected Stakeholders and Perceived Impact 
 Increase (66.7% of Letters) 
Decrease 
(23.3% of Letters) 
Mixed 
(10.0% of Letters) 
Preparers 64.0% 33.3% 76.9% 
Users 48.8% 40.0% 38.5% 
Auditors 9.3% 20.0% 23.1% 
Panel C indicates the percentage of comment letters that audit firms perceive as increasing, decreasing, or mixed 
complexity. Conditional on this percentage, this table reports the extent to which, when audit firms perceive a 
change as either increasing or decreasing complexity, or having a mixed affect, they also perceive that change to 
affect preparers, users, or auditors. This table can be read as: 66.7% of comment letters identify a proposed change 
to increase complexity; of these letters, 64.0% of them discuss the impact on preparers and 48.8% discuss the impact 
on users.  
 
Panel D: Themes that Audit Firms Perceive to Affect Certain Stakeholders 
 
Preparers 
(58.1% of Letters) 
Users 
(45.7% of Letters) 
Auditors 
(13.2% of Letters) 
Degree of Choice 57.3% 57.6% 52.9% 
Level of Clarity 53.3% 52.5% 35.3% 
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Level of Consistency 54.7% 57.6% 58.8% 
Variation in Standards 32.0% 42.4% 35.3% 
Operationality of Standards 56.0% 55.9% 70.5% 
Usability of Standards 34.7% 59.3% 41.2% 
Auditability of Standards 20.0% 13.6% 47.1% 
Panel D indicates the percentage of comment letters discussing the impact of complexity on preparers, users, or 
auditors, and conditional on this percentage, the extent to which each theme is discussed. This table can be read as: 
58.1% of comment letters discuss the impact of complexity on preparers, 45.7% discuss the impact on users, and 
13.2% discuss the impact on auditors. Of the letters discussing the impact of complexity on preparers, 57.3% of 






Between-Firm Consistency  
 
Panel A: Consistency between Firms with Respect to Positions 
  Percentage 
Letters take a similar position with respect to a proposal (either all support or all oppose) 65.7% 
Letters take different positions with respect to a proposal 34.3% 
 
 
Panel B: Consistency between Firms with Respect to Perceived Impacts 
Percentage 
Letters agreed on a proposal's effect on complexity 62.9% 
Letters all agreed that the proposed change would increase complexity  48.6% 
Letters all agreed that the proposed change would decrease complexity  11.4% 
Letters all agreed that the proposed change would have a mixed affect 2.9% 
Letters disagreed on the effect of a proposal on complexity 37.1% 
 
 
Panel C: Consistency between Firms with Respect to the Root Cause of Complexity 
Consistency% Inconsistency% 
Degree of Choice 37.1% 62.9% 
Level of Clarity 34.3% 65.7% 
Level of Consistency 22.9% 77.1% 
Variation in Standards 42.9% 57.1% 
Operationality of Standards 40.0% 60.0% 
Usability of Standards 42.9% 57.1% 
Auditability of Standards 71.4% 28.6% 
 
Table V shows between-firm consistency in discourse with respect to position (Panel A), perceived impact on 
complexity (Panel B), and root cause of complexity (Panel C). For the comment letters on proposals that we have 
coded, we identify those proposals that have at least two effective comment letters allowing us to do a consistency 
analysis. Consistency is reached if all effective letters with respect to a proposal have the same opinion. For 
instance, in Panel C, the consistency percentage refers to the proportion of proposals in which all firms’ effective 
comment letters indicate that a particular dimension of complexity is/is not a root cause of complexity in the 
proposed standard. 
 
 
